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Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games:
a Multi-Retailer Inventory Application
D. Bauso, L. Giarre´, and R. Pesenti
Abstract
We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative
dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of the above solutions
by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize
the above solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social
optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm
that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns
a sequence of joint decisions, each one obtained from the previous one by an unilateral improvement
on the part of a single player. We also specialize the game to a multi-retailer inventory system.
Keywords: Game Theory, Inventory, Consensus Protocols, Dynamic Programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a finite horizon noncooperative game [2] where the stage cost of the ith player
associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players
making the same decision. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the
game. In Section III, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria and of at least one Pareto
optimal Nash equilibrium. We do this by recasting the game within the framework of potential
games [15] which always admit at least one Nash equilibrium, although, its computation is a
non trivial issue [7], [10], [17], [18]. In Section IV and V, we show that stronger results are
obtained if the horizon reduces to a single stage. We find all Nash equilibria and in particular a
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Pareto optimal one that is social optimal in the set of all Nash equilibria, as it minimizes the sum
of the players’ costs. We also define a consensus protocol [3], [12], [13], [14] that makes the
players converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. We do this in agreement with a large
body of literature on evolutionary game theory and fictitious play (see e.g., the book [5] and
[16]) that centers around the convergence to refined Nash equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria that
meet special properties. Social and Pareto optimality are just properties characterizing the Nash
equilibria to which the dynamics induced by the consensus protocols converges. In Section VI, we
come back to the multi-stage game and we modify the above protocol to derive a so called best
response path algorithm that makes the players converge to a Nash equilibrium. This algorithm
is based on the property of potential games establishing that any best response path converges
to a Nash equilibrium [15], [16]. A best response path is a sequence of joint decisions, each one
obtained from the previous one by an unilateral improvement on the part of a single player. In
Section VII, we specialize the game to a multi-inventory application [1], [6], [8], [9], [11].
II. NONCOOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAME
We deal with a discrete time finite horizon noncooperative game which presents all the
ingredients typical of an inventory application. However, we deal with the game in its general
form in order to emphasize what characteristics make the results of this paper hold.
Consider a set of n players Γ = {1, . . . , n} and let N be the horizon length. For each i ∈ Γ
and each stage k = 0, . . . , N , let xki ∈ Xki ⊆ Z be a discrete time state and uki ∈ Uki ⊆ N
be a decision. Here, we have denoted by Xki and Uki the set of feasible states and decisions at
stage k and by Z, N the set of integers and non negative integers (zero included), respectively.
Let uk−i = {ukj}j∈Γ,j 6=i be the vector of the decisions of players j 6= i at stage k. Also, define
uk = {uki }i∈Γ, ui = {u
0
i , . . . , u
N
i } and u−i = {u0−i, . . . , uN−i}. Let the following finite horizon
noncooperative game be given: for each player i ∈ Γ,
Jˆi(x
0
i ,ui,u−i) =
N∑
k=0
gi(x
k
i , u
k
i , a(u
k)) (1)
xk+1i = Ξ(x
k
i , u
k
i ), k = 0, . . . , N − 1, (2)
where equation (1) is the cost function, obtained as sum over the horizon of a stage cost
gi(x
k
i , u
k
i , a(u
k)) and equation (2) is the state dynamics with Ξ(., .) being a generic nonlinear
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function, possibly time variant and player specific, but such that limuk
i
→+∞ Ξ(x
k
i , u
k
i ) = +∞,
for all xki ∈ Z. The stage cost gi(xki , uki , a(uk)) is of type
gi(x
k
i , u
k
i , a(u
k)) = δ(uki )ψ(a(u
k)) + γ(xki , u
k
i ), (3)
where: function δ(uki ) is equal to one if uki > 0 (we say that the ith player is active), and zero
otherwise; function a(uk) returns the number of active players (at time k), a(uk) =∑nj=1 δ(ukj );
function ψ(a(uk)) is positive and strictly decreasing on a(.); function γ(xki , uki ) is coercive, non
negative and independent of a(.). Henceforth, for the short of notation, we write ak to mean
a(uk). Also we denote by u = [u1, . . . ,un] a generic solution of the game (in the following we
also use the notation [ui,u−i] to mean u). Finally, we define Ji(x0i ,u−i) = minui Jˆi(x0i ,ui,u−i).
III. NASH AND PARETO OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria, and characterize the Pareto optimal
ones. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria by exploiting the well-known result in [15]
asserting that a noncooperative game always admits a pure Nash Equilibrium if a potential
function exists. A potential function is a function Φ(x0,u) such that, if uˆ = [uˆi, uˆ−i] is a
solution obtained from an unilateral deviation from u on the part of a generic player i (hence
ui 6= uˆi, but u−i = uˆ−i), the difference induced to the potential function ∆Φ = Φ(x0, [uˆi, uˆ−i])−
Φ(x0, [ui,u−i]) is equal to, or at least proportional to, the difference in the cost for player i, that
is, ∆Jˆi = Jˆi(x0i , uˆi, uˆ−i)− Jˆi(x0i ,ui,u−i).
Theorem 1: Game (1)-(2) is a potential game.
Proof: We prove that Φ(x0,u) = ∑Nk=1
(∑a(uk)
j=1 ψ(j) +
∑
v∈Γ γ(x
k
v , u
k
v)
)
is a potential
function for game (1)-(2). To this end, let a solution [ui,u−i] be given and consider a second
solution [uˆi, uˆ−i] obtained from an unilateral deviation on the part of a generic player i. Our aim
is to show that ∆Φ = ∆Jˆi. Now, for all v ∈ Γ, let x1v, . . . , xNv and xˆ1v, . . . , xˆNv be the sequence
of states obtained from (2) under decisions [ui,u−i] and [uˆi, uˆ−i] respectively. Then it holds
∆Jˆi = Jˆi(x
0
i , uˆi, uˆ−i)− Jˆi(x
0
i ,ui,u−i) =
=
N∑
k=1
(δ(uˆki )ψ(a(uˆ
k)) + γ(xˆki , uˆ
k
i )− δ(u
k
i )ψ(a(u
k))− γ(xki , u
k
i )) =
=
N∑
k=1


a(uˆk)∑
j=1
ψ(j) +
∑
v∈Γ
γ(xˆkv , uˆ
k
v)−
a(uk)∑
j=1
ψ(j)−
∑
v∈Γ
γ(xkv , u
k
v)

 = ∆Φ,
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where the fourth equality (from line 2 to 3) is a direct consequence of δ(uˆki )ψ(a(uˆk))+γ(xˆki , uˆki )−
δ(uki )ψ(a(u
k))−γ(xki , u
k
i ) =
∑a(uˆk)
j=1 ψ(j)+
∑
v∈Γ γ(xˆ
k
v , uˆ
k
v)−
∑a(uk)
j=1 ψ(j)−
∑
v∈Γ γ(x
k
v , u
k
v). The
latter equality is true as, for all k = 1, . . . , N , the following conditions hold
∑
v∈Γ, v 6=i
γ(xˆkv , uˆ
k
v)−
∑
v∈Γ, v 6=i
γ(xkv , u
k
v) = 0 (4)
δ(uˆki )ψ(a(uˆ
k))− δ(uki )ψ(a(u
k)) =
a(uˆk)∑
j=1
ψ(j)−
a(uk)∑
j=1
ψ(j). (5)
Condition (4) holds as the decisions and the states as well of any player v 6= i are unchanged;
formally, ukv = uˆkv and xkv = xˆkv . To prove that condition (5) holds, observe that it must hold
a(uˆk) = a(uk) ± 1. Actually, if only player i may change decision then the number of active
players either reduces by 1 (player i changes from being active to being non active) or increases
by 1 (player i changes from being non active to being active). Consider, for instance, the latter
case, we have δ(uˆki )ψ(a(uˆk)) − δ(uki )ψ(a(uk)) = ψ(a(uˆk)). We also have a(uˆk) = a(uk) + 1,
which implies that
∑a(uˆk)
j=1 ψ(j)−
∑a(uk)
j=1 ψ(j) = ψ(a(uˆ
k)). We can conclude that rhs and lhs of
(5) are equal. Symmetrical argument apply to the case where player i changes from being active
to being not active. In this situation, both sides of (5) are equal to −ψ(a(uk)).
As a consequence, by the results in [15], we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Game (1)-(2) admits at least one Nash equilibrium.
Let us now characterize a generic Nash equilibrium u∗ = [u∗i ,u∗−i] where u∗i = {u0∗i , . . . , uN∗i }
and u∗−i = {u0∗−i, . . . , uN∗−i }. In particular, we consider the ith player and study the unilateral
improvements by fixing the decisions of all other players over the horizon u∗−i. We denote by
a
k∗ = {ak∗, . . . , aN∗} with akˆ∗ =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i δ(u
kˆ∗
j ) + δ(u
kˆ
i ) for kˆ = k, . . . , N . The vector ak∗
collects the number of active players from stage k to N as a function of {uki , . . . , uNi } and for
fixed {uk∗−i, . . . , uN∗−i }. By applying the dynamic programming approach to (1)-(2), we can define
JNi (x
N
i , a
N∗) = 0, (6)
Jki (x
k
i , a
k∗) = minuk
i
∈Uk
i
[gi(x
k
i , u
k
i , a
k∗) + Jk+1i (x
k+1
i , a
k+1∗)] . (7)
Then, Ji(x0i ,u∗−i) is equal to J0i (x0i , a0∗). In solving (6)-(7), we can do as if ak∗ was independent
of uki . Actually, we can substitute ak∗ by a˜k =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i δ(u
k∗
j ) + 1, for k = 0, . . . , N . We
can do such a substitution as it turns out that gi(xki , uki , ak∗) = gi(xki , uki , a˜k). To see why the
latter equality holds true, observe that the stage cost gi(xki , uki , ak∗) depends on ak∗ only through
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the term, δ(uki )ψ(ak∗), which is different from zero only when δ(uki ) = 1, that is when ak∗ =
ak∗ − δ(uki ) + 1 = a˜
k
. It follows that the best response for player i must be a solution of
equation (7), i.e.,
uk∗i = arg min
uk
i
∈Uk
i
[δ(uki )ψ(a
k∗) + γ(xki , u
k
i ) + J
k+1
i (x
k+1
i , a
k+1∗)] =
= arg min
uk
i
∈Uk
i
[δ(uki )ψ(a˜
k) + γ(xki , u
k
i ) + J
k+1
i (x
k+1
i , a˜
k+1)], (8)
where we define a˜k = {a˜k, . . . , a˜N} for k = 0, . . . , N . The above equation may present multiple
solutions. However, the values assumed by uk∗i depends on the other player decisions only in
terms of the number of active players. With this in mind, we can derive that given two equilibria
uˆ and u˜, if δ(uˆki ) = δ(u˜ki ) for all i ∈ Γ and for all k = 0, . . . , N − 1, then the two equilibria
are equivalent, that is Jˆi(x0i , uˆi, uˆ−i) = Jˆi(x0i , u˜i, u˜−i) for all i ∈ Γ. In the following, in case of
multiple solutions, we choose uk∗i as the lowest among the possible scalar values that satisfy (8).
In this way we guarantee the uniqueness of the best response and we can describe the equilibria
indifferently in term of either u∗ or a0 given their bijective correspondence. Needless to say that
the players can choose any other criterium that guarantees the uniqueness of the best response
in (8) without compromising the validity of the results.
Let us observe that the payoff Jˆi(x0i ,ui,u−i) of player i is independent of u−i if the player
is never active, i.e., uki = 0 for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1. Denote such a payoff value as Jˆi(x0i ,0, .).
Then, in any equilibrium point u∗ the following inequality hold Ji(x0i ,u∗−i) ≤ Jˆi(x0i ,0, .). Also,
the finiteness of the horizon, the behavior of γ(., .) and Ξ(., .) imply that Jˆi(x0i ,ui,u−i) → ∞
if, for some k = 0, . . . , N − 1, |uki | → ∞. Then, for each player i ∈ Γ, there exists a finite
value B(x0i ) ≥ 0, function of the initial state x0i , such that in any equilibrium point u∗ we have
|uk∗i | ≤ B(x
0
i ) for all stages k = 0, . . . N , as otherwise we have Ji(x0i ,u∗−i) > Jˆi(x0i ,0, .). As
for any Nash equilibrium each component is an integer value satisfying 0 ≤ uk∗i ≤ B(x0i ) for
all k = 0, . . . N , then Nash equilibria are finite in number. The next theorem follows.
Theorem 2: At least a Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Proof: As the Nash equilibria are finite in number, there must necessarily exist a Nash
equilibrium that is not dominated.
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IV. SINGLE STAGE GAME
We now consider a finite horizon noncooperative game consisting in a single stage game with
payoffs (in all the equations of this subsection we drop the dependence on k)
Jˆi(xi, ui, u−i) = δ(ui)ψ(a(u)) + γ(xi, ui), (9)
where all the variables and functions have the same definitions and properties of the original
game. Game (9) is trivially obtained from the original game by imposing N = 0.
For each i ∈ Γ, let l : Z → N, increasing function of xi, be given. Henceforth, we simply use
the notation li to mean l(xi), i.e., the value of the function for fixed xi. Note that in the single
stage game and once fixed the scenario (xi fixed), xi becomes a known parameter (the initial
inventory) and therefore we can omit dependence of l(xi) on xi.
Definition 1: A threshold strategy is any function u˜(.) : N × N −→ R such that u˜(a, li)
assumes a positive value if a ≥ li and is null otherwise. In this case li is said threshold.
The above threshold strategy says that player i is active only if the number of active players a
is greater than or equal to threshold li. Let us now characterize a Nash equilibrium, u∗ =
[u∗1, . . . , u
∗
n], for the single stage game, where u∗i is the best response of player i. Again, denote
by a∗ =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i δ(u
∗
j) + δ(ui) the vector collecting the number of active players as a function
of ui and for fixed u∗−i. Condition (8) becomes
u∗i = arg min
ui∈Ui
[δ(ui)ψ(a
∗) + γ(xi, ui)], (10)
and in case of multiple solutions we choose u∗i as the lowest among the possible scalar values
that satisfy the above equation. Note that in (10) we can replace a∗ by a˜ =∑nj=1,j 6=i δ(u∗j) + 1
and use the same trick explained for the solution of (6)-(7).
Lemma 1: At a Nash equilibrium u∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u∗n], the best response u∗i of each player i is
a threshold strategy u∗i = u˜(a∗, li) with threshold
li = min{µ ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ψ(µ) < γ(xi, 0)}. (11)
Proof: Let us first prove that the best response u∗i of player i is a threshold strategy. On
this purpose, for each player i, and for any number of active players β ≥ α, let ζα and ζβ be the
best responses for a∗ = α and a∗ = β respectively (they solve (10) with a∗ = α and a∗ = β).
We show that if ζα > 0 (it means δ(ζα) = 1, the ith player is active) then ζβ > 0. To see this
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observe that ζα > 0 only if
ψ(α) + γ(xi, ζα) ≤ γ(xi, 0).
As ψ(.) is a positive function, to have ζβ > 0 it suffices to prove that
ψ(β) + γ(xi, ζβ) ≤ γ(xi, 0).
Note that the rhs of the above two inequalities are equal as they do not depend on the number
of active players. Then we can show that the latter inequality holds as
ψ(β) + γ(xi, ζβ) ≤ ψ(β) + γ(xi, ζα) ≤ ψ(α) + γ(xi, ζα) ≤ γ(x
k
i , 0), (12)
where the first inequality is due to the optimality of ζβ and the second inequality is due to the
monotonicity of ψ on the number of active players. Then, we have proved that u∗i = u˜(a∗, li).
Now, to see that the threshold is as in (11) observe that it must also hold ψ(α) + γ(xi, u∗i ) <
γ(xi, 0) for all α ≥ li and ψ(α) + γ(xi, u∗i ) ≥ γ(xi, 0) for all α < li. But the latter conditions
hold if and only if the value of li is as in (11).
As in (7), the best response u∗i defined in the above lemma depends on other players course
of action u∗−i only through a∗. In the next theorem we characterize the unique Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium. To this aim, let us relate Nash equilibria to subsets of players as follows.
Without loss of generality, assume that the players are indexed increasingly on their thresholds,
i.e., l1 ≤ l2 ≤ . . . ≤ ln. Define compatible set any set of consecutive players C = {1, . . . , r}
such that lr ≤ r. Any player of a compatible set C benefits from being active if all the other
players in C are active. Observe that for any Nash equilibrium u∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u∗n] there exists a
compatible set C such that δ(u∗i ) = 1 if and only if i ∈ C. Indeed, let iˆ = max{i : δ(u∗i ) = 1},
then δ(u∗i ) = 1 for all i ∈ Γ such that i < iˆ since li ≤ lˆi. Now, consider the maximal compatible
set C = {1, . . . , λ¯} where
λ¯ = argmax
λ
{λ ∈ {1, . . . , n} : lλ ≤ λ} .
Note that C may be empty and that, by maximality of C, li > λ¯ + 1 for all players i 6∈ C.
Lemma 2: There always exists a Nash equilibrium u∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u∗n] such that δ(u∗i ) = 1 if
and only if i ∈ C
Proof: The solution u∗ describes the case where the active players are the only players in
C and therefore the number of active players is λ¯. Then, no players i ∈ C benefit by unilaterally
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deciding of becoming non active as li ≤ λ¯ and also no players j 6∈ C benefit by deciding of
becoming active as lj > λ¯ + 1.
Theorem 3: Let u∗ be the Nash equilibrium associated to the maximal compatible set C, i.e.,
δ(u∗i ) =


1 if i ∈ C
0 otherwise
.
If ψ(λ¯) + γ(xi, u∗i ) 6= γ(xi, 0) for all i ∈ C, then
• Pareto optimality. The Nash equilibrium u∗ is Pareto optimal;
• Uniqueness. The Nash equilibrium u∗ is the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
• Social optimality. The Nash equilibrium u∗ is social optimal in the set of all Nash equilibria.
Proof: Pareto optimality. We show that the Nash equilibrium u∗ = [u∗1, . . . , u∗n] is Pareto
optimal since any other vector of strategies u = [u1, . . . , un] induces a worse payoff for at least
one player. In the Nash equilibrium u∗, each i ∈ C gets a payoff Jˆi(xi, u∗i , u∗−i) = ψ(λ¯) +
γ(xi, u
∗
i ) < γ(xi, 0), each i 6∈ C gets a payoff Jˆi(xi, 0, u∗−i) = γ(xi, 0) < ψ(λ¯ + 1) + γ(xi, ui)
for all ui > 0. Now, consider the vector of strategies u. Define D = {i ∈ C : δ(ui) = 0} as the
set of players with li ≤ λ¯ that are not active in u and E = {i 6∈ C : δ(ui) = 1} as the set of
players with li > λ¯ + 1 that are active in u. Let us denote by ν and η the cardinality of D and
E respectively. Trivially, D ∪ E 6= ∅ as u 6= u∗. We deal with E 6= ∅ and E = ∅ separately.
If E 6= ∅ and D = ∅, each player i ∈ E gets a payoff Jˆi(xi, ui, u−i) = ψ(λ¯ + η) + γ(xi, ui)
strictly greater than Jˆi(xi, 0, u∗−i) = γ(xi, 0) as C is the maximal compatible set. The latter
condition trivially holds also when D 6= ∅ since, in this case, each player i ∈ E incurs in a
higher payoff Jˆi(xi, ui, u−i) = ψ(λ¯ + η − ν) + γ(xi, ui).
If E = ∅, then D 6= ∅, and each player i ∈ C \ D, if exists, gets a payoff Jˆi(xi, ui, u−i) =
ψ(λ¯− ν) + γ(xi, ui) > Jˆi(xi, u
∗
i , u
∗
−i) = ψ(λ¯) + γ(xi, u
∗
i ). At the same time, each player i ∈ D
gets a payoff Jˆi(xi, 0, u−i) = γ(xi, 0) > Jˆi(xi, u∗i , u∗−i) = ψ(λ¯)+γ(xi, u∗i ). Finally, each i ∈ Γ\C
gets a payoff Jˆi(xi, 0, u−i) = γ(xi, 0) = Jˆi(xi, 0, u∗−i).
Uniqueness and social optimality. We prove the uniqueness and the social optimality of the
Pareto optimal Nash Equilibrium by showing that it dominates all the other equilibria. Consider a
generic Nash equilibrium u associated to a compatible set C, say λ its cardinality, different from
C. Since C is maximal then C ⊂ C. Then, each i ∈ C, if exists, gets a payoff Jˆi(xi, ui, u−i) =
ψ(λ) + γ(xi, ui) > Jˆi(xi, u
∗
i , u
∗
−i) = ψ(λ¯)+ γ(xi, u
∗
i ); analogously, each i ∈ C \C gets a payoff
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Jˆi(xi, ui, u−i) = γ(xi, 0) > Jˆi(xi, u
∗
i , u
∗
−i) = ψ(λ¯) + γ(xi, u
∗
i ); finally, each player i ∈ Γ \ C,
gets a payoff Jˆi(xi, ui, u−i) = γ(xi, 0) = Jˆi(xi, u∗i , u∗−i). Then, in any generic Nash equilibrium
each player has a payoff not better than the one associated to u∗.
Observe that if and only if ψ(λ¯)+γ(xi, u∗i ) = γ(xi, 0) for all i, there exist two Pareto optimal
Nash equilibria with equal payoff. They are associated respectively to the maximal compatible
set C and to the empty set. Henceforth, we will call Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium only
the equilibrium u∗ associated to the maximal compatible set C. Also, observe that there is no
other Nash equilibrium with a higher number of active players than the Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium. Let us finally note that the minimizer of the sum of players’ costs, say it social
optimum, is in general not an equilibrium. However, if we restrict the minimization within the
set of Nash equilibria, then the social optimum is on the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium as
it has been shown in the above theorem. Restricting the minimization within the set of Nash
equilibria makes sense as the players participate to a noncooperative game, then any solution
that is not an equilibrium is of no interest.
V. CONSENSUS PROBLEM
With focus on the single stage game (9), we now introduce a protocol that makes the players
strategies converge to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium characterized in Theorem 3.
For all players i ∈ Γ, let us refer to aˆi as their estimate of a in the assumption that each player
may exchange information only with a subset of neighbor players. In this sense, the set Γ induces
an undirected connected graph G = (Γ, E) whose edgeset E includes all non oriented couples
(i, j) of players that exchange information with each other. Also, define the neighborhood of
player i the set Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {i}. Let zi(τ) ∈ R be a continuous time variable
describing the transmitted information for τ ≥ 0 and let T be a sufficiently large time interval.
The information flow is managed through a distributed protocol Π = {(fi, φi) : for all i ∈ Γ}
z˙i(τ) = fi(zj(τ) for all j ∈ Ni), 0 ≤ τ ≤ T, (13)
aˆi(τ) = φi(zi(τ)) (14)
u∗i = u˜(aˆi,ss, li) (15)
where fi : Rn → R describes the dynamics of the transmitted information of the ith node as a
function of the information both available at the node itself and transmitted by the other nodes,
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as in (13); φi : R → R estimates, based on current information, the aggregate info, as in (14).
The protocol receives as input xi and zj for all j ∈ Ni and must be initialized at a pre-defined
value zi(0). The value of xi is used in (15) to compute li according to (11). The protocol uses
the estimate aˆi,ss to return as output the best response u∗i as in (15), where aˆi,ss represents the
steady state value assumed by aˆi(τ), namely
aˆi,ss = lim
τ→T−
aˆi(kT + τ), for all i ∈ Γ. (16)
In the rest of this section, we present a distributed protocol Π = {(fi, φi) : for all i ∈ Γ}
proposed by the authors in [4], such that the steady state estimate coincides with the current
number of active players and with λ¯, i.e., aˆi,ss = a =
∑
i∈Γ δ(ui) = λ¯. Actually, the latter
condition is sufficient for the convergence to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of Theorem 3.
Assume that the transmitted information zi(τ) is the current estimate of the percentage of
active players. For instance, zi(τ) = 0.2 means that the ith player estimates only a twenty
percent of active players. Then, given the percentage of active players zi(τ), the estimate of the
number of active players is simply
aˆi(τ) = φ(zi(τ)) = nzi(τ).
The protocol starts by assuming that all the players are active. This corresponds to initialize
the transmitted states zi(0) = 1 or which is the same the estimates aˆi(0) = n for all i ∈ Γ.
Then, each player averages its estimate on-line on the basis of neighbors’ estimates. If we
denote by z(τ) = {zi(τ)}i∈Γ, the averaging process can be described by
fi(z(τ)) = −Li•z(τ)−∆(t− ti)
where Li• is the ith row of the Laplacian matrix (see, e.g., [12], [16] for details), and ∆(t− ti)
is an impulse signal due to which zi(t−i ) switches to a lower value zi(t+i ). Such a switch has
the meaning of a correction term acting at any time ti where the estimate aˆi(ti) crosses from
above the threshold li and consequently the ith player is no longer willing to be active. Impulses
may be activated only after the transient evolution of z˙i(τ) has expired. We assume that this
occurs after tf time units, where tf is an estimate of the worst case possible settling time of
the protocol dynamics. A standard result in graph theory is that the settling time decreases as
the number of edges in the network increases. Actually, the speed of convergence depends on
the second smallest in magnitude eigenvalue of the Laplacian (known as Fiedler eigenvalue) in
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the sense that the higher (in magnitude) the Fiedler eigenvalue the faster the convergence [13].
In the light of the above consideration, ti is the first sampled time rtf , with r = 0, 1, . . . where
function δ(u˜(aˆi(rtf ), li)) reaches zero, namely
ti = argmin
r∈N rtf (17)
s.t. δ(u˜(aˆi(rtf ), li)) = 0. (18)
Note that there may exist players characterized by li > n, for which ti = 0, and players
that never satisfy condition (18), for which ti = T . Observe that, as players are indexed by
increasing thresholds, it must also hold T ≥ t1 ≥ t2 ≥ . . . ≥ tn ≥ tn+1 = 0. Furthermore, note
that the evolution of the sampled values z(rtf ) for r = 0, 1, . . . is monotonically decreasing
which implies that the impulse may be activated only one time for each player (once you exit
the group you are no longer allowed to rejoin it).
Theorem 4: It holds aˆi,ss = a =
∑
i∈Γ δ(ui) = λ¯ for all i ∈ Γ.
Proof: With in mind the values ti as in (17), let us set tn+1 = 0, t0 = T and consider
the sequence of increasing discrete times tn+1, tn, . . . , tj+1, tj, . . . , t0. Also denote recursively
by M(tj) = {i ∈ A(tj) : li > |A(tj)|}, where A(tj) = Γ \
⋃n+1
k=j+1 M(tk), and A(tn+1) = Γ.
Roughly speaking, A(tj) is the set of players that are willing to be active at time tj whereas
M(tj) is the set of players that are no longer willing to be active from time tj on. Then the
evolution of aˆi(τ) follows the discrete time dynamics
aˆi(tj−1) = aˆi(tj)− |M(tj)|, for all i ∈ Γ.
The above dynamics is monotonic decreasing and converges at the first time tj where A(tj) is
a compatible set. To see this, note that if A(tj) is compatible then M(tj) = ∅, and therefore
aˆi(T ) = . . . = aˆi(tj−1) = aˆi(tj), for all i ∈ Γ.
The above equation implies that tj−1 = tj−2 = . . . = T , which means that condition (18)
is never met for player j − 1, if exists, and for all its predecessors, if any. In the extreme
case, we may have A(tj) = . . . = A(t1) = ∅ which means tj < T for all j ∈ Γ and also
that condition (18) is met for all players j ∈ Γ. We have then proved that the above dynamics
converges whenA(tj) is compatible. It is left to show that the compatible setA(tj) is the maximal
one, namely, A(tj) = C. We show this, by proving that if A(tk) ⊇ C then A(tk−1) ⊇ C for all
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k = j + 1, . . . , n + 1. By contradiction, if A(tk−1) 6⊇ C, there must exist a player i ∈ M(tk)
such that li ≤ |C| ≤ |A(tk)| but the latter fact is not possible from the definition of M(tk). We
conclude the proof by observing that
⋂n+1
k=j+1 M(tk) = ∅ and consequently
aˆi(tj) = n−
n+1∑
k=j+1
|M(tk)| = |Γ \
n+1⋃
k=j+1
M(tk)| = |A(tj)| = |C| = λ¯.
VI. A BEST RESPONSE PATH ALGORITHM
We have shown that the game (1)-(2) is a potential game as it always admits a potential
function (see Theorem 1). Potential games have the strong property that any best response path
converges to a Nash equilibrium. By best response path we intend a sequence of joint decisions
u(0) → u(1) → . . . where u(j) = {u1(j) . . .un(j)} and ui(j) is the vector of decisions (over
the horizon) of player i at iteration j. Define a function σ : N → Γ, which returns a player
for each iteration j of the sequence, i.e., σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 5 . . . means that at iteration 1,
only player 2 updates its decision, whereas at iteration 2, only player 5 updates its decision.
By updating a decision we simply mean replacing the current decision by the best response. It
may happen that the current decision is already the best response and then the updated decision
coincides with the current decision. Now, each joint decision u(j + 1) is obtained from u(j)
by an unilateral improvement on the part of player i = σ(j), i.e., u(j + 1) = [u∗i ,u−i(j)] and
u
∗
i = {u
0∗
i , . . . , u
N∗
i } is the solution of (8) for fixed u−i(j + 1) = u−i(j).
More precisely, at iteration j, let the current decision be u(j) = {u1(j), . . . ,un(j)} with
ui(j) = {u
0
i (j), . . . , u
N
i (j)} for i = 1, . . . , n. To solve (8) player i = σ(j) needs to estimate the
number of active players over the horizon. This is possible by modifying the protocol presented
in the previous section. For fixed u(j), denote the vector of decisions at time k by uk(j) =
{uki (j)}i∈Γ, then the protocol Π = {(fi, φi) : for all i ∈ Γ}, where
fki (z(τ)) = −Li•z
k(τ), zki (0) = δ(u
k
i (j)) (19)
aˆki (τ) = φ(z
k
i (τ)) = nz
k
i (τ). (20)
is such that aˆki,ss = a(uk(j)). Remind that a(uk(j)) is the number of active players at stage
k given the decision vector uk(j). Repeating the same argument for k = 0, . . . , N (we can
run the protocol in parallel) the ith player can estimate the number of active players over the
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horizon a0(j) associated to the current decision u(j), namely, a0(j) = {a(u0(j)), . . . , a(uN(j))}
with a(uk(j)) =
∑
i∈Γ δ(u
k
i (j)). In the light of the above comments, we show below the pseudo
code of an algorithm that, for a given function σ(.), returns a best response path and consequently
converges to a Nash equilibrium. Let ui(j) be the solution (decisions of player i) at iteration j,
then
j = 0; WHILE not converging
{i = σ(j), compute a0(j) from (19)-(20) using current u(j)
update ui(j + 1) = u∗i solution of (8) based on a0(j),
j := j + 1}
The algorithm eventually converges to a Nash equilibrium which depends on the chosen func-
tion σ(.). However, the choice of any generic function σ(.) do not compromise the convergence
of the algorithm. The number of iterations is at most 2nN . Actually, the best response for player
i does not depend on the value of u−i, but only on the number of active players. Also, the
algorithm can be stopped if no players have changed their decisions in the last n iterations. In
the next section we use the above algorithm in a multi-inventory application.
VII. MULTI-INVENTORY APPLICATION
Each player i ∈ Γ is a retailer, the state xki ∈ Z is the ith inventory, uki ∈ Uki = N is the
ordered quantity. Let wki ∈ N be a deterministic demand, the inventory dynamics is
xk+1i = x
k
i + u
k
i − w
k
i . (21)
Let c be the purchase cost per stock unit, h the penalty on holding, p the penalty on shortage,
and Kki the transportation cost charged to the ith retailer that replenishes at stage k. Also, let
us make the common assumption that c− p < 0. The stage cost for the ith retailer is
gi(x
k
i , u
k
i , a
k) = Kki︸︷︷︸
ψ(ak(uk))
δ(uki ) + cu
k
i + pmax(0,−x
k+1
i ) + hmax(0, x
k+1
i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ(xk
i
,uk
i
)
. (22)
Here ψ(ak(uk)) is monotone since the active retailers may share the same truck for their supplies
and so the more they are, the less each of them pays for the transportation.
Example 1: Consider three retailers and parameters K = 24, p = 8, h = 1, c = 2. Retailers
face a deterministic demand over the horizon of ten stages (see Table I). The initial state is
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w1 4 8 6 5 7 8 4 5 6 8
w2 0 0 1 7 8 0 6 2 1 4
w3 0 3 2 0 3 1 1 3 3 0
TABLE I
x0 = [0 0 0]. Let us run the algorithm of the previous section in order to obtain a best
response path. The retailers, at the first iteration, do not consider the possibility of sharing
the transportation cost. No communication occurs among the retailers and they replenish in a
fully uncoordinated fashion as displayed in Fig. 1, left column. The absence of coordination
is evident as retailer 1 replenishes on days 0, 2, 5 and 8 (top-left), retailer 2 on day 3 and 6
(middle-left), while retailer 3 on days 1 and 7 (bottom-left). At a second iteration, the 3rd
retailer (σ(2) = 3) estimates the number of active players over the horizon by running the
protocol (19)-(20) and finds its best response by solving (8). The same argument is repeated at
the successive iterations letting the retailers unilaterally improving their payoffs one after the
other. The algorithm converges in six iterations. The supply decisions at Nash equilibrium are
displayed in Fig. 1, right column. Here you can notice that retailers 1 and 3 replenish on day 1,
retailers 1, 2 and 3 replenish on day 3 and 7, and retailer 1 and 2 on day 5.
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